FinCEN Files: banke, sumnjive transakcije i rupe u nadzoru

The FinCEN Files, published in September 2020, revealed how banks reported suspected financial activity to the authorities while significant flows of money continued through the international banking system. The investigation was based on more than 2,100 suspicious activity reports, or SARs, filed with the United States Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, known as FinCEN. The documents covered transactions worth more than 2 trillion US dollars between 1999 and 2017.

The records did not represent a complete picture of global money laundering. They were a limited set of confidential reports obtained by BuzzFeed News and shared with the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, or ICIJ, and its media partners. Even so, the documents offered an unusually detailed view of how banks, regulators, companies and intermediaries handled transactions that had raised serious questions.

What is a suspicious activity report?

A suspicious activity report is a confidential notification that a bank or another regulated financial institution submits to a competent authority when it detects activity that may require examination. In the United States, SARs are filed with FinCEN. They can concern unusual transfers, unclear ownership structures, transactions that do not match a customer’s known business, or activity involving jurisdictions and individuals considered to present elevated risks.

A SAR is not a judgment, a criminal charge or proof that a crime has occurred. Filing a report does not establish that the customer committed money laundering, fraud or another offence. It records a concern that may help law-enforcement agencies and financial-intelligence units decide whether further investigation is necessary. A transaction mentioned in a SAR may ultimately have a legitimate explanation, while criminal activity may also remain undetected when no report is filed.

How the investigation was conducted

BuzzFeed News obtained the confidential documents and worked with ICIJ and journalists in many countries to examine them. The reporting team compared the SARs with court records, company documents, regulatory findings, government data and interviews. This collaborative method made it possible to trace transactions across borders and to examine the roles of banks, companies, brokers and other intermediaries.

The investigation was not based on the assumption that every person or organisation named in a report had broken the law. Journalists presented the documents as evidence of warnings and weaknesses in the system, not as automatic proof of criminal conduct. That distinction is essential when dealing with confidential financial intelligence, where a bank’s suspicion can reflect uncertainty rather than established wrongdoing.

The central finding: reporting did not always stop the money

The FinCEN Files showed that banks sometimes continued to process transactions after filing SARs. Under anti-money-laundering rules, submitting a report does not necessarily require a bank to close an account or stop every transfer. Institutions may have legal, regulatory and practical reasons for continuing a relationship while authorities assess the information. In some cases, however, the documents raised questions about how long banks continued handling activity they themselves had described as suspicious.

This exposed a structural tension in the system. Banks are expected to monitor customers and report concerns, but public authorities may not immediately respond, may lack sufficient information, or may not tell the bank whether an investigation is under way. As a result, a SAR can become a warning sent into a system that is dependent on cooperation between private institutions and public agencies.

International transactions and regulatory gaps

Many of the transactions examined by the investigation crossed several jurisdictions. Money could move through correspondent banks, companies registered in different countries and accounts controlled by intermediaries. Each institution might see only part of the activity, while differences between national rules and enforcement practices created additional blind spots.

The documents also illustrated the importance of identifying the beneficial owner—the individual who ultimately controls or benefits from a company or account. Complex corporate structures can have legitimate uses, but they can also make it difficult to establish who is responsible for a transaction. When ownership information is incomplete, outdated or hidden behind layers of companies, financial institutions and investigators face greater difficulty assessing risk.

Why the findings matter to Europe

Although FinCEN is a United States agency, the reporting had clear international relevance. Banks in Europe and elsewhere participate in the global correspondent-banking system, and transactions can pass through several financial centres before reaching their final destination. Weaknesses in one jurisdiction can therefore affect institutions, public budgets and communities in another.

For Croatia and other European Union member states, the investigation also highlighted the importance of effective cooperation between banks, national financial-intelligence units, police, prosecutors, customs authorities and cross-border institutions. Strong rules are not sufficient if suspicious information is not shared promptly, ownership records are unreliable, or investigations cannot follow money across national borders.

What the documents do—and do not—show

• The documents show that banks identified transactions or relationships they considered suspicious enough to report.
• They show how information moved between financial institutions and FinCEN during the period covered by the records.
• They can reveal patterns, delays and weaknesses in compliance and enforcement systems.
• They do not, by themselves, prove that every named customer committed a crime.
• They do not establish that every transaction described in a SAR was illegal.
• They do not provide a complete register of all suspicious financial activity worldwide.

Responsible reporting therefore requires careful language and additional verification. A person or company mentioned in a SAR should not be described as a criminal solely because a bank filed a report. The meaning of each document depends on its context, the available evidence and the findings of competent authorities or courts.

A broader lesson for public oversight

The FinCEN Files demonstrated that anti-money-laundering systems rely on more than technical monitoring. They depend on clear accountability, adequate resources, accurate company information, effective supervision and the ability of authorities to act on warnings. When one part of that chain fails, suspicious activity can remain unresolved even when concerns have been formally recorded.

The investigation also showed the public value of cross-border journalism. No single newsroom could easily examine thousands of confidential reports, banking relationships and corporate records spanning many countries. Cooperation between BuzzFeed News, ICIJ and partner organisations allowed journalists to compare evidence, identify recurring patterns and present the findings with local context.

Sources and methodology

This article is based on the FinCEN Files investigation published by BuzzFeed News and the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists in 2020, together with explanatory material from FinCEN concerning suspicious activity reports and anti-money-laundering reporting. The figures and descriptions refer to the document set and reporting published by those organisations. A SAR is treated here as an alert submitted to authorities, not as proof of criminal conduct.